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 An article with so sweeping a title needs to egin with a consideration 
o% methodological iss+es and the a+thor’s premises.  The most important o% 
these is that the United States is not j+st a ig E+ropean co+ntry that %loated 
across the Atlantic.  In some ways the United States has more in common 
with Brazil—the other large co+ntry in which slavery lasted well into the 
nineteenth cent+ry—than with France or even the United Kingdom.  
 All co+ntries are “exceptional” in varying degrees depending on the 
%rame o% re%erence, +t virt+ally everyone agrees that an important part o% 
c+rrent American distinctiveness—a term less %ra+ght with implications o% 
s+periority—is the high degree o% religiosity.  By many standards the United 
States is the most conventionally religio+s ig, rich co+ntry.  Claimed weekly 
attendance at religio+s services hovers aro+nd 40% o% the pop+lation 
compared to 10 to 15% in Western E+rope.  To e s+re, claimed ch+rch 
attendance is not the only—or even necessarily the est—meas+re o% %aith. 
Brazil and Mexico, %or example, may e im+ed with higher levels o% day-to-
day religiosity than the United States.  Still, the need to claim attendance at 
religio+s services even among those who do not act+ally go ill+strates how 
important pro%essions o% %aith remain in American li%e.
 Even a long ook co+ld arely do j+stice to the complicated connections 
etween American religio+s %aiths and politics.  For the past two decades 
commentators have disc+ssed what they call (with characteristic American 
hyperole) a “c+lt+re war” containing a large religio+s component. 
S+spicio+s o% the military metaphor that evokes images o% religio+s con%licts 
in Iraq or the Balkans, I pre%er to think in terms o% a “c+lt+ral sho+ting 
match,” the latest in a long series o% sho+ting matches thro+gh which we 
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have tried to de%ine and rede%ine a normative “American Way o% Li%e.” 
Whatever the pre%erred term (I have almost given +p trying to delegitimize 
“c+lt+re war”), we m+st recognize that religion-related con%lict has persisted 
at the local level even in eras when the sho+ting rarely made national news. 
Altho+gh Americans, +nlike citizens o% many other co+ntries, have never 
killed each other in large n+mers %or reasons relating to religion, neither 
has there een a golden age devoid o% signi%icant religio+s con%lict.  
 For the p+rposes o% this rie% article, I de%ine American political li%e as 
national politics and government.  In keeping with the interests o% my 
a+dience, I tilt the story toward relatively recent events and increasingly 
attend to presidential politics as we approach the present.  
 In making sense o% %aith and politics, we m+st rememer, too, that not 
only have the speci%ic religions in the United States changed since 
independence in 1776, +t so, too, has the general degree o% religiosity, in 
and o+t o% the p+lic sphere.  For instance, viewed collectively and in 
historical context the most recent six presidents (Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, 
Ronald Reagan, George H.W. B+sh, Bill Clinton, and George W. B+sh) were 
more conventionally Christian than the %irst six (George Washington, John 
Adams, Thomas Je%%erson, James Madison, James Monroe, and John Q+incy 
Adams).
 In addition, we m+st avoid theological determinism.  Scholars ro+tinely 
acknowledge the chicken and egg relationship etween p+ritanism and the 
rise o% capitalism.  Similarly, no one claims that the Taiping reellion in 
nineteenth cent+ry China, proaly the largest civil war in history, occ+rred 
simply eca+se Taiping leader Hong Xi+q+an had mystical visions which he 
interpreted +nder the in%l+ence o% Western Christian missionaries.  Yet, 
partic+larly among rivals in o+r c+rrent c+lt+ral sho+ting match, there is a 
strong inclination to exaggerate the signi%icance %or p+lic policy o% the 
“theology” o% American political leaders past and present.  Nor sho+ld we 
%orget that presidents—and other political leaders—are people too.  As with 
other people, their “theologies” may change over time, their religio+s haits 
may persist even a%ter the s+pernat+ral %o+ndations erode, and their day-to-
day ehavior may not match their declared elie%s.  
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 Nothing is less edi%ying than the vog+e o% interpreting contemporary 
American %oreign policy via all+sions to p+ritan John Winthrop’s description 
o% his 1630 Massach+setts settlement as a “city +pon a hill.”  Many who 
cherish this all+sion in 2008 have no idea that Winthrop took this phrase 
%rom Jes+s’s Sermon on the Mo+nt.  
 In short, thro+gho+t American history, the private and p+lic %aith o% 
national leaders has een in%l+enced y non-religio+s %actors—notaly 
economics, class, race, and %oreign policy—as well as the other way aro+nd.
 In 1776 the %ree pop+lation o% the newly independent United States 
consisted overwhelmingly o% heirs to the British or German Protestant 
Re%ormation.  Ethnic and theological di%%erences among these 
“denominations” +lked larger at the time than is +s+ally recognized y 
twenty-%irst cent+ry commentators, who tend to regard most white 
Protestants as nearly indisting+ishale.  The pop+lation also incl+ded 
ro+ghly 25,000 Catholics and a %ew tho+sand Jews.  Many o% the Protestants 
had had their %ervor enhanced d+ring a mid eighteenth cent+ry revival that 
is +s+ally called, tho+gh not witho+t controversy, the First Great Awakening. 
Scholars disagree ao+t the greatness and n+mer o% awakenings over the 
cent+ries, with pla+sile estimates ranging as high as six and as low as zero. 
I elieve that something important happened +t, sh+nning typical 
American hyperole, will descrie the mid eighteenth cent+ry revival as the 
%irst o% %ive Pretty Good Awakenings.
 A less amicale disp+te rages over whether or not the United States was 
%o+nded as a Christian nation.  The controversy centers on the %aith o% the 
capital F Fo+nders with whom most Americans have at least a vag+e 
%amiliarity: Washington, Adams, Je%%erson, Madison, and Benjamin Franklin. 
As jo+rnalist Jon Meacham recently oserved, conservative Christians are 
seeking “historical enediction y association with the origins o% the 
Rep+lic” (Meacham, p.235).
 Aside %rom their place in the patriotic pantheon there is no good reason 
%or the pop+lar arg+ment ao+t religion in the early rep+lic to center on 
Washington, Adams, Je%%erson, Madison, and Benjamin Franklin.  These men 
158
di%%ered among themselves ao+t the importance o% ch+rch attendance, the 
possiility o% li%e a%ter death, and the degree to which God g+ided h+man 
a%%airs.  Nonetheless, in%l+enced y Enlightenment deism, they were not 
among the most devo+t Americans o% their day; their God was amorpho+s 
rather than anthropomorphic.  Contemporary conservatives who want to 
emphasize the importance o% Christianity in the early rep+lic wo+ld do 
etter to elevate the rep+tations o% less %amo+s +t more orthodox %ig+res to 
the rank o% capital F Fo+nder.  Rev. John Witherspoon, a delegate to the 
second Continental Congress that declared independence, and John Jay, the 
%irst Chie% J+stice, wo+ld e good prospects.  Or conservatives might 
oserve, in a kind o% religio+s Charles Beardianism, that the Constit+tional 
Convention o% 1787 was +nrepresentative o% the pop+lation at large. 
Accordingly, the de%inition o% a (male) capital F Fo+nder sho+ld e 
roadened to incl+de at least anyone who %o+ght in the Revol+tion, served 
at any level o% government etween 1774 and 1789, or voted %or delegates to 
the state conventions that rati%ied the Constit+tion.
 As an economic Beardian, I %avor a roader de%inition o% capital F 
Fo+nders in general, +t s+ch a modi%ication as I propose here wo+ld 
provide only limited solace to contemporary evangelicals in search o% a 
+sale past.  The Constit+tion and First Amendment were adopted d+ring 
the least conventionally religio+s period in American history and, in 
comination, they created a sec+lar rep+lic at the %ederal level.  Unlike the 
Articles o% Con%ederation, the governmental charter it replaced, the 
Constit+tion made no re%erence to God; it also %orade a religio+s test %or 
%ederal o%%ice.  The First Amendment arred a national “estalishment o% 
religion” as well as inter%erence with the “%ree exercise thereo%.”  Like many 
parts o% the Constit+tion as adopted and amended, these provisions 
involved compromises and/or were the prod+cts o% haste rather than a 
care%+l parsing o% lang+age.  Some orthodox Christians joined 
Enlightenment thinkers in opposing a %ederal estalishment o% religion in 
order to protect their mild state estalishments, thro+gh which citizens were 
taxed to s+pport one or more %aiths; the last o% these, in Massach+setts, was 
aolished in 1833.  The religio+s cla+ses o% the First Amendment were 
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necessarily general and potentially in con%lict with each other, especially as 
later generations tried to st+%% the realities o% the nineteenth, twentieth, and 
twenty-%irst cent+ries into an eighteenth cent+ry social contract.  
 As Je%%erson oserved in Notes on Virginia (1786) and as some 
contemporary social scientists now arg+e with an economic twist, the 
asence o% an estalished ch+rch helped religion to %lo+rish.  Lacking 
government s+pport, denominations had to compete %or memers and 
contri+tions in order to thrive.  Competing %aiths %o+nd many c+stomers, 
so to speak, among nineteenth cent+ry democrats who elieved that every 
%ree white man had a right to his own interpretation o% Script+re.  Religio+s 
diversity a%%ected politics %rom the o+tset.  In the %irst party system that 
egan to %orm in the 1790s, Rep+licans (the ancestors o% the contemporary 
Democratic party) tended to %avor what their %irst president, Thomas 
Je%%erson, later called a “wall o% separation” etween ch+rch and state. 
D+ring the presidential campaign o% 1800, in which Je%%erson +ltimately 
de%eated Federalist President John Adams, the Federalists inacc+rately 
portrayed Je%%erson as a “howling atheist.”  In theology, Je%%erson had m+ch 
in common with Adams, who also denied Jes+s’s divinity, +t his o+tspoken 
endorsements o% religio+s lierty and enth+siasm %or anticlerical French 
revol+tionaries osc+red the similarities.
 Important religio+s changes were well +nder way y the time Je%%erson 
was elected in 1800.  A Second Pretty Good Awakening, eg+n in the 1790s, 
contin+ed +ntil the 1840s.  Ch+rch memership grew rapidly; Baptists and 
Methodists im+ed with the democratic ethos %ared partic+larly well in the 
market place o% religio+s ideas.  New religio+s gro+ps sp+n o%% %rom 
Protestantism, notaly the Seventh-day Adventists and the Ch+rch o% Jes+s 
Christ o% Latter-Day Saints (LDS), pop+larly known as Mormons.  Starting 
in the 1830s, the arrival o% h+ndreds o% tho+sands o% German and Irish 
Catholic immigrants complicated the religio+s scene.  S+stantial German 
Jewish immigration added another layer o% complexity starting in the 1840s.
 Mainstream awakened Protestants increasingly cooperated in a wide 
array o% re%ormist organizations promoting temperance, peace, ed+cation, 
insane asyl+ms, prison re%orm, %oreign missions, conversion o% Catholics and 
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Jews, and (%or a rave minority at %irst) anti-slavery.  Less likely to e 
rememered even y historians is the e%%ort to pass a constit+tional 
amendment declaring the United States a Christian nation.  Unlike twenty-
%irst cent+ry evangelicals and %+ndamentalists, these nineteenth cent+ry 
activists knew that the Constit+tional Convention and First Amendment had 
created a sec+lar rep+lic.  Eq+ally revealing, the Christian Amendment 
never came close to congressional passage.  Despite the Second Pretty Good 
Awakening, many Enlightenment attit+des, incl+ding skepticism o% 
s+pernat+ral religion and religio+s estalishments, never entirely 
disappeared.
 The thirty years prior to the o+treak o% the Civil War in 1861 ro+ght 
the %iercest p+lic clashes over religion-related iss+es in American history. 
These iss+es divided the two major parties in the second party system, the 
Whigs and the Democrats (s+ccessors to the Je%%ersonian Rep+licans). 
Broadly speaking, while the Whigs ecame the home o% white Protestants in 
general and white Protestant re%ormers in partic+lar, the Democrats ro+ght 
together +nder the leadership o% Andrew Jackson were more hospitale to 
%ree thinkers and Catholic immigrants.  There were exceptions to the r+le, 
however, incl+ding in the 1830s and 1840s the %ree thinking yo+ng Whig 
Araham Lincoln.  As states started to create p+lic school systems, 
Catholics and Protestants egan their long sho+ting match over the 
c+rric+l+m, which o%ten inc+lcated de %acto Protestant elie%s, and the 
q+estion o% government %+nding %or Catholic parochial schools.  Catholics 
and Protestants sometimes %o+ght or even killed one another in election day 
riots tho+gh no one sho+ld ass+me that the working class to+ghs involved 
were motivated y the %ine points o% theology.
 The most vehement critics o% the Catholic Ch+rch and its immigrant 
sons and da+ghters are +s+ally called nativists, a derisive term coined y 
their %oes.  Speaking in the typical conspiratorial idiom o% the mid nineteenth 
cent+ry, nativists envisioned a remarkaly e%%ective Catholic conspiracy 
stretching %rom the Vatican to American parishes.  Protestant nativist activity 
incl+ded incessant polemics, %req+ent political moilizations, occasional acts 
o% violence, and co+ntless petty o%%enses.  A lock o% marle donated y 
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Pope Pi+s IX %or incl+sion in the Washington Mon+ment was destroyed y 
nativists who %eared that the “Pope’s stone” wo+ld de%ile George 
Washington’s memory.  D+ring the 1850s the nativist American party, etter 
known as the Know Nothings, elected more than 100 memers o% Congress.
 Altho+gh still +se%+l to historians and social scientists, the category 
nativist m+st e applied with care.  There were (and are) legitimate con%licts 
over religion and p+lic policy that sloppy +se o% the term osc+res or over-
simpli%ies.  Moreover, even in the volatile three decades e%ore the Civil War, 
con%lict etween Protestants and Catholics %ell %ar short o% a c+lt+re war.  In 
1829, when Catholics ecame eligile to r+n %or the British Parliament, they 
already held high o%%ice in the United States.  In 1836 Roger B. Taney, a 
Catholic %ormer secretary o% the treas+ry, was appointed Chie% J+stice.  When 
the United States went to war against Mexico in 1846, President James K. 
Polk, a devo+t Presyterian, rep+diated any notion o% an assa+lt on 
Catholicism, employed Catholic diplomatic emissaries, and appointed 
Catholic military chaplains.  O% co+rse %ervent Protestants viewed the war as 
a victory over popery.  To a large degree, however, advocates o% “Mani%est 
Destiny” tho+ght American expansion was ordained y a non-sectarian 
Providence.
 The pre-Civil War deate over slavery shows how political iss+es—in 
this case, the great p+lic iss+e o% the nineteenth cent+ry—can in%l+ence 
religio+s developments as well as the other way aro+nd.  Both advocates 
and enemies o% slavery cited the Bile to s+pport their respective positions. 
Despite some amig+ities, a literal reading o% the text served so+thern 
slaveholders etter than northern aolitionists.  As they pointed o+t, Jes+s 
had never condemned slavery and St. Pa+l had +rged masters to treat slaves 
well, a sign that Pa+l accepted the instit+tion as legitimate.  In response, anti-
slavery clergy oth invoked the general h+mane spirit o% Christianity and 
noted that many practices sanctioned in the Bile had ecome o+tdated. 
Less committed than so+therners to a literal reading o% Script+re on the 
slavery iss+e, northern Protestant aolitionists ecame less committed to a 
literal reading o% Script+re in general.  When the Civil War ended, their 
hearts and minds were th+s prepared to accept higher criticism o% the Bile 
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and related aspects o% lieral theology.
 I% the death and destr+ction ca+sed y the Civil War had come %i%ty 
years later when sec+lar and anti-religio+s ideas were m+ch stronger, as was 
the case in E+rope d+ring World War I, these horrors might have made the 
United States less religio+s in the long r+n.  In %act, the war made the 
co+ntry more religio+s.  
 President Araham Lincoln is a case in point.  Lincoln’s religion has 
recently attracted enormo+s scholarly attention, not least eca+se 
contemporary theological conservatives sometimes try to claim him, like the 
capital F Fo+nders, as one o% their own.  Here, too, the e%%ort is in vain. 
Altho+gh Lincoln grew +p in a religio+s %amily, knew Script+re well, and 
q+oted it o%ten, his shi%ting %aith was in%l+enced y the resid+al c+rrents o% 
%ree tho+ght that s+rvived long a%ter the Enlightenment.  He never joined a 
ch+rch or claimed Jes+s as a personal savior.  His spirit+al search +ltimately 
led to what a recent iographer, Allen G+elzo, calls “Calvinized deism” 
(G+elzo, p.447).  The o+tcome o% the Civil War, Lincoln s+ggested in his 
%amo+s second ina+g+ral address, might e determined y God’s will rather 
than h+man e%%orts.  
 The era etween the Civil War and the 1890s prod+ced a Third Pretty 
Good Awakening with the +s+al pattern o% res+lts along with some new 
developments.  There were %resh religio+s spin-o%%s %rom Protestantism, 
incl+ding Christian Science and the m+ch persec+ted Jehovah’s Witnesses. 
Protestant re%ormers escalated campaigns against prostit+tion, pornography, 
toacco, alcohol, and sec+larism.  A minority among them tilted toward 
economic lieralism in the American sense o% the term, that is, advocacy o% 
government reg+lation on ehal% o% the working class and the poor.  An even 
smaller minority, represented most impressively y Rev. Walter 
Ra+schen+sch, %avored an American version o% Christian socialism.  Yet 
most social gospelers emphasized not p+lic works +t private charitale 
deeds—o%ten mixed with personal sacri%ice.  This was the main message o% 
the most pop+lar o% many social gospel novels, Rev.  Charles Sheldon’s In 
His Steps, which prompted readers to ask, “What wo+ld Jes+s do?”
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 D+ring the Third Pretty Good Awakening Protestant orthodoxy %aced 
the strongest challenges since the Enlightenment.  Higher criticism o% the 
Bile and Charles Darwin’s theory o% evol+tion precipitated a split etween 
theological lierals and theological conservatives (the most active o% whom 
came to e known as %+ndamentalists y the 1920s).  Adversaries %rom the 
two camps disagreed ao+t ilical inerrancy, Jes+s’s divinity, h+man 
sin%+lness, and the nat+re o% God’s kingdom.  The +nderlying iss+e was 
whether or not Christianity is a s+pernat+ral religion.  Yet even among 
contending clergy, %ew chose to pose the q+estion so starkly, and many 
ch+rch goers chose in time honored %ashion to mix lieral and conservative 
positions in ways that %elt personally com%ortale.
 An overwhelmingly Protestant c+lt+re enco+ntered these intellect+al 
challenges at the same time as a predominantly Catholic and Jewish “new 
immigration” egan in the 1880s.  By the 1920s, ro+ghly 27 million 
immigrants had arrived.  Uns+rprisingly, then, Protestant re%orm o%ten 
incl+ded heightened nativism.  Anti-Semitism rose steadily %rom the Civil 
War to the 1940s.  The American Protective Association (APA), a grassroots 
anti-Catholic loy, was %o+nded in 1887.  Uns+rprisingly, too, con%licts 
connected to religion were commonplace in politics.  Be%ore Prohiition 
ecame a strong national movement in the early 1900s, the most prominent 
o% these con%licts still centered on the d+al q+estion o% de %acto Protestantism 
in the p+lic school c+rric+l+m and possile government %+nding o% 
Catholic schools.
 The Rep+lican Party, %o+nded in the 1850s as a coalition o% %ormer 
Whigs, Know Nothings, and anti-slavery Democrats, s+cceeded the de%+nct 
Whigs as the %avored party o% northern white Protestants.  The late 
nineteenth cent+ry Democrats, in many ways still a Jacksonian party, 
remained religio+sly more diverse and philosophically more skeptical o% 
legislation en%orcing personal morality.  To p+t the point more vividly, 
Rep+lican presidents in the late nineteenth cent+ry typically drank 
lemonade and sang hymns aro+nd the White Ho+se piano, while Grover 
Cleveland, the only Democrat elected etween 1856 and 1912, enjoyed a 
good glass o% eer.  Cleveland may have won in 1884 partly eca+se his 
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predecessor, Chester A.  Arth+r, an atypically +rane Rep+lican president 
%or that era, alienated temperance voters y restoring alcohol to White 
Ho+se dinners.
 Amid the Third Pretty Good Awakening, 1896 prod+ced the most 
devo+t pair o% major party presidential nominees in history—Presyterian 
Democrat William Jennings Bryan and Methodist Rep+lican William 
McKinley.  As a candidate, McKinley %lirted with the nativists.  As president, 
he appointed a Catholic attorney general and welcomed the %oremost 
Catholic clergyman, Cardinal James Gions, to participate in ina+g+ral 
ceremonies.  The war against Spain in 1898, McKinley emphasized, was not 
an assa+lt on Catholicism.  McKinley also declared national days o% prayer 
d+ring the war, asked God whether or not the United States sho+ld keep the 
Philippine islands that had een capt+red %rom Spain, and in%erred that God 
answered in the a%%irmative.
 Middle class %ear o% social t+rmoil, the rie% rise o% the People’s Party 
(considered radical in the American context), and gen+ine h+manitarian 
sentiments comined to prod+ce what historians warily call the Progressive 
era in the %irst two decades o% the twentieth cent+ry.  Q+estions o% laeling 
aside, this period did yield a asic reg+latory state at the national level.  Two 
o% the progressive era presidents, Rep+licans Theodore Roosevelt and 
William Howard Ta%t, were pro %orma Christians whose %aith was 
reminiscent o% that o% the capital F Fo+nders.  A Unitarian, Ta%t did not 
consider Jes+s the Son o% God.  At minim+m, Roosevelt had do+ts ao+t 
Jes+s’s divinity and the existence o% an a%terli%e.  Presyterian Democrat 
Woodrow Wilson, whose name ecame synonymo+s with the American 
sense o% mission, was a theological lieral who descried the Bile as a 
re%ormist “people’s ook o% revelation.”  Despite their lieral theology, oth 
Roosevelt and Wilson said occasionally that God had made them president.
 The so-called Progressive era coincided with a Fo+rth Pretty Good 
Awakening.  Accordingly, Protestant re%ormers played major roles, 
especially in local h+manitarian e%%orts to improve living and working 
conditions.  Nationwide Prohiition, which egan in 1920, was at least as 
m+ch a “progressive” ca+se as creation o% the Federal Reserve System. 
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Progressivism as a worldview emphasized national +nity across class, ethic, 
and religio+s lines.  To some extent, there%ore, nativism at the national level 
was s+merged eneath a s+rrogate religion o% “100% Americanism.” 
Theodore Roosevelt appointed the %irst Jew to a cainet post and egan the 
presidential practice o% cons+lting with Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish 
leaders ao+t re%ormist meas+res.
 Nonetheless, religio+s con%lict and o+tright igotry persisted and may 
have grown stronger at the grassroots.  Protestant advocates o% m+nicipal 
re%orm deno+nced Catholic +ran osses and saloon keepers (categories that 
sometimes overlapped in %act as well as rhetoric).  Opponents attacked 
President Wilson %or appointing a Catholic as his chie% White Ho+se 
assistant and a Jew as an associate J+stice o% the S+preme Co+rt.  Intra-
Protestant con%lict also seems to have een on the rise d+ring the so-called 
Progressive era.  Some theological conservatives were appalled y Ta%t’s 
election.  The split within Protestantism widened etween lierals, who 
were increasingly attracted to the social gospel, and conservatives, who 
viewed saving so+ls as the highest priority.
 World War I and the intense %ear o% revol+tion that %ollowed—the Red 
Scare—t+rned c+lt+ral splits into chasms.  The “twenties” was the most 
intense period o% religio+s con%lict since the three decades e%ore the Civil 
War.  Protestant theological lierals and conservatives itterly disp+ted 
doctrinal q+estions within several major denominations.  Altho+gh esoteric 
in some respects, this “%+ndamentalist controversy” reached a national 
a+dience when theological conservatives advocated ans on the teaching o% 
Darwinian evol+tion in the p+lic schools.  One s+ch law, in Tennessee, was 
challenged y sec+larists and religio+s lierals in the legendary 1925 “Scopes 
monkey trial”; the legal challenge %ailed and state ans were not r+led 
+nconstit+tional y the United States S+preme Co+rt +ntil 1968.
 Evidence %or the contin+ed rise o% anti-Semitism is +iq+ito+s d+ring 
the 1920s.  Leading +niversities, law schools, and medical schools restricted 
the admission o% Jews.  An extraordinary conspiracy theory, whose sponsors 
incl+ded Henry Ford, held that a secret caal o% Jews controlled oth 
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capitalism and Comm+nism, all the etter to destroy Christian civilization. 
The K+ Kl+x Klan, which attracted as many as %ive million memers early in 
the decade, damned Jewish cosmopolitanism as one o% two o+tstanding 
threats to “100% Americanism.”  The other o+tstanding threat was 
Catholicism in mani%estations ranging %rom an +ndemocratic ch+rch 
str+ct+re controlled %rom aroad to c+lt+rally in%erior immigrants taking 
control o% American cities.
 Thro+gho+t the 1920s Rep+licans and Democrats di%%ered m+ch more 
ao+t iss+es relating to religion than ao+t economics and %oreign policy; 
the prevailing opinion in oth parties %avored limited government at home 
and p+rs+it o% an “in%ormal empire” o% trade and in%l+ence aroad.  The 
Democrats remained m+ch more hospitale to Catholics and, partly %or this 
reason, contained the most prominent critics o% Prohiition (“wets” in the 
idiom o% the day).  In 1928, on his second serio+s attempt, the “wet” Catholic 
Al%red E. Smith won the Democratic presidential nomination.  A devo+t 
ch+rch goer nonetheless devoid o% doctrinal interests, Smith never 
+nderstood why his %aith ecame a major iss+e in the election.
 Altho+gh Protestant theological conservatives o%%ered the %iercest 
rhetoric, lieral social gospelers also criticized Smith as the representative o% 
an +ndemocratic, alien ch+rch.  Rep+lican nominee Herert Hoover 
endorsed religio+s tolerance—which voters co+ld interpret either as a 
rejection o% anti-Catholic nativism or as a criticism o% papal a+tocracy. 
Rep+lican o%%icials worked ehind the scenes with avid nativists on 
Hoover’s ehal%.
 The Great Depression that %ollowed the stock market Crash o% 1929 
ended %o+r decades o% Rep+lican dominance o% national politics.  The New 
Deal eg+n +nder President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s leadership in 1933 not 
only expanded the reg+latory state and created a asic wel%are state, +t also 
helped to change the American religio+s scene.  Roosevelt ro+ght the 
overwhelming majority o% Catholics and Jews into his remarkale coalition, 
a coalition that still contained most so+thern white conservative Protestants, 
%or whom religio+s iss+es seemed less important than economic need or 
preservation o% white s+premacy.
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 Roosevelt %amo+sly de%lected a q+estion ao+t his philosophy y calling 
himsel% a “Christian and a Democrat.”  Altho+gh he attended ch+rch 
irreg+larly, he was a Christian—an ec+menical Episcopalian whose simple 
%aith incl+ded a sense o% d+ty and a commitment to religio+s tolerance.  In 
2008, political and religio+s lierals are less likely than conservatives to recall 
that FDR spoke o%ten ao+t religion.  Sometimes he ro+ght eminent %oreign 
visitors, incl+ding King George VI and Winston Ch+rchill, along to services. 
Roosevelt +rged an appreciation o% all %aiths.  He %req+ently cited the 
Almighty as the so+rce o% political %reedom and asked God to less America. 
Among the evils o% Nazism, FDR said in 1941, was Adol% Hitler’s plan to 
destroy all religions—Hind+ and M+slim as well as Christian and Jewish. 
Roosevelt anno+nced the D Day invasion o% E+rope in J+ne 1944 y reading 
a long prayer he had written himsel%.
 Roosevelt’s p+lic religiosity derived %rom political needs as well as 
private %aith.  D+ring the Depression he s+cceeded so well as an advocate o% 
economic lieralism because he so+nded s+%%iciently conservative on c+lt+ral 
iss+es, incl+ding matters o% %aith, to de%lect charges that the New Deal was 
+n-American.  This strategy was not easy to manage eca+se, %rom the 
perspective o% religio+s conservatives, his alliances and actions seemed 
anything +t conservative.  There were many Catholics, Jews, and irreverent 
cosmopolitans in his administration.
 The %iercest criticism came %rom a Christian right that egan to moilize 
against the New Deal %rom the o+tset.  Altho+gh only the name o% Father 
Charles Co+ghlin, the “radio priest” who s+pported and then roke with 
FDR lingers in American memory, many other devo+t Catholic and 
Protestant critics o% the New Deal were eq+ally notorio+s d+ring the 1930s. 
In their view, Roosevelt’s sins typically incl+ded recognition o% the Soviet 
Union, association with Jews and cosmopolitan sec+larists, and marriage to 
a %eminist “new woman.”   The worst leaders o% the old Christian right 
acc+sed Roosevelt o% elonging to the international Jewish conspiracy 
working to destroy Christian civilization.  Unlike their Catholic co+nterparts, 
the Protestant rightists also stressed the repeal o% Prohiition in 1933.  There 
was eno+gh common gro+nd, however, %or Protestants to +ild alliances 
168
with Catholics on the right that wo+ld have een inconceivale d+ring the 
1920s.
 Most %+ndamentalists did not ecome political activists o% any sort. 
Rather, they spent the 1930s +ilding an in%rastr+ct+re o% colleges, 
seminaries, and p+lications—and praying %or a religio+s revival that %inally 
egan as the United States edged toward entry into World War II.
 This Fi%th Pretty Good Awakening contin+ed at least +ntil the early 
1960s, when ch+rch and synagog+e memership stood at ro+ghly 70% o% 
the pop+lation.  Once again the revival spawned new religions (notaly 
Scientology) and s+rrogate religions (notaly h+manistic psychology).  O+r 
main concern, however, is the religio+s mainstream d+ring the “social-
c+lt+ral %i%ties” (which needs to e disting+ished %rom the mere 
chronological %i%ties as de%ined y the decimal system).  The social-c+lt+ral 
%i%ties stretched %rom ro+ghly 1947-48, when Cold War orthodoxy came to 
dominate the national mood, to 1965-1966, when do+ts ao+t the Vietnam 
War catalyzed a reconsideration o% social and c+lt+ral iss+es that had een 
dormant or s+ppressed since the 1920s or 1930s.
 The “%i%ties” religio+s mainstream was roader than leading social 
scientists, linded y a sec+larization model o% modern society, discerned at 
the time.  Instead o% dying o+t, Protestant theological conservatism adapted 
and thrived.  Many o% these conservatives joined Rev. Billy Graham in calling 
themselves evangelicals rather than %+ndamentalists.  Graham ecame more 
stylish in his sel%-presentation, dropped old osessions like temperance and 
Darwinism, and eschewed public criticism o% Catholics and Jews. 
Pentecostals adapted less rapidly than evangelicals tho+gh animosity 
etween these two versions o% Protestant conservatism declined.  The Fi%th 
Pret ty Good Awakening also insp i red some +nreconstr+cted 
%+ndamentalists, incl+ding yo+ng Rev. Jerry Falwell who %o+nded a 
separatist Baptist congregation in 1956.
 A common misperception is that religio+s conservatives took little 
interest in politics +ntil the 1970s.  In a relatively staid period like the 
“%i%ties,” there were %ewer explicitly Protestant moilizations on the right 
than had een the case d+ring the 1930s.  Nonetheless, e%%orts to in%l+ence 
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government policy contin+ed.  Behind the scenes Billy Graham, a %riend o% 
oth President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Vice President Richard M. Nixon, 
was +p to his neck in Rep+lican politics.
 As Graham’s increasing polish and p+lic veneer o% nonpartisanship 
s+ggest, as religio+s %aith ecame more pervasive in the “%i%ties,” its sectarian 
content eroded.  While agreeing that the United States was one o% the most 
religio+s ig, rich co+ntries, skeptical commentators wondered how m+ch 
s+stance lay ehind ro+tine attendance at religio+s services.  Jes+it John 
Co+rtney M+rray gr+mled ao+t the co+ntry’s adherence to “religion-in-
general, whatever that is” (M+rray, p.37)
 What that is had een clear since Benjamin Franklin walked the streets 
o% Philadelphia.  According to Franklin, all %aiths except a %ew on the %ringes 
were legitimate and sho+ld cooperate to promote private well-eing and 
p+lic virt+e instead o% sq+aling ao+t doctrine.  A%ter the Enlightenment, 
proponents o% religion-in-general typically expected God to less America. 
D+ring the “%i%ties” this nationalistic %orm o% civil religion energized—and 
was energized y—the Cold War against “godless Comm+nism.”  Congress 
adopted “In God We Tr+st” as the national motto and added “+nder God” 
to the Pledge o% Allegiance to the Flag.
 President Eisenhower worked diligently to personi%y the virt+es o% 
religion-in-general.  Perhaps, as historian Gary Scott Smith s+ggests, 
Eisenhower looked more religio+s than FDR eca+se the whole American 
Zeitgeist had ecome more religio+s since the 1930s.  He certainly looked 
devo+t in comparison to his Democratic opponent in 1952 and 1956, Adlai 
Stevenson, who was the most sec+lar major party nominee since William 
Howard Ta%t.
 Eisenhower joined the Presyterian ch+rch a%ter his election to serve as 
an example to the nation, delivered a prayer he had written at his %irst 
ina+g+ration, egan cainet meetings with prayer, and appointed a 
Congregationalist minister as his White Ho+se religio+s liaison.  In 1959 he 
invited the visiting Soviet leader Nikita Khr+shchev to join him at S+nday 
services; Khr+shchev declined.  Eisenhower’s %req+ent invocations o% God as 
the so+rce o% %reedom and protector o% the United States resemled 
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Roosevelt’s—tho+gh Comm+nism now replaced the Axis as the national 
enemy.  The White Ho+se tried with mixed s+ccess to promote road 
inter%aith cooperation in international a%%airs.  The President was 
exasperated that Catholics, Jews, M+slims, and vario+s kinds o% Protestants 
co+ld not +ry their doctrinal di%%erences in order more e%%ectively to comat 
Comm+nism.
 Eisenhower has o%ten een ridic+led %or saying that the American “%orm 
o% government has no sense +nless it is %o+nded in a deeply-%elt religio+s 
%aith, and I don’t care what it is” (q+oted in Meacham, p.177).  Certainly this 
o%% hand comment was not the most learned de%ense o% religion-in-general. 
Nonetheless, these sentiments %itted into a coherent worldview and 
delierate political strategy.  Altho+gh his own Rep+lican party had 
in%lamed the itter sho+ting match over %oreign policy that helped to elect 
him in 1952, Eisenhower then so+ght to +ni%y and calm the co+ntry. 
F+rthermore, religion-in-general was not witho+t merits compared to 
religion in sectarian partic+lar.  Anti-Semitism declined steadily a%ter the late 
1940s as celeration o% a recently concept+alized “J+deo-Christian tradition” 
s+perseded re%erences to “Christian Americanism.”  The Mormons, the only 
ch+rch that had engaged in an act+al religio+s war (a small one against the 
United States army in the 1850s), %inally won acceptance as a rep+tale 
denomination.
 The “%i%ties” seem land to Americans looking ack %rom 2008 not only 
eca+se there was peace a%ter the Korean tr+ce in 1953 as well as 
extraordinary prosperity, +t also eca+se this staility was sandwiched 
etween two remarkaly volatile eras.  Depression and World War II had 
come e%ore; the Vietnam War and social +pheaval %ollowed.  Even so, none 
o% those who risked their lives to end white s+premacy in the segregated 
So+th recalls a period o% domestic tranq+ility.  War scares and %req+ent 
paramilitary interventions s+ggest that international peace was eq+ally 
amig+o+s.
 Nor was the religio+s scene devoid o% contention.  Indeed, while 
adherents to diverse denominations +s+ally lived amicaly as neighors, 
Catholics and Protestant leaders escalated their c+lt+ral sho+ting match. 
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There were important iss+es at stake.  Most Catholics still wanted 
government aid to parochial schools and most Protestants still opposed it. 
The Catholic hierarchy deno+nced irth control and %avored censorship o% 
sexy ooks and %ilms; lieral Protestants %req+ently disagreed.
 Aove and eyond the speci%ic iss+es, Catholics %elt +nappreciated. 
Catholics had served disproportionately in the armed %orces %or more than a 
cent+ry and, +nlike a notale minority o% lieral Protestants, none had %lirted 
with Comm+nism d+ring the 1930s.  Despite this record o% “100% 
Americanism,” their %ellow citizens alked at electing a Catholic president.
 A%ter Democrat John F. Kennedy de%eated Rep+lican Richard Nixon in 
1960, p+ndit Richard Scammon q+ipped that a Catholic co+ld win the 
presidency i% he was a millionaire war hero with a ea+ti%+l wi%e.  And, as 
Scammon might have added, i% he ran as a st+rdy cold warrior.
 According to the standard estimate, Kennedy’s Catholicism cost him 1.5 
million votes in 1960.  He compensated in part y winning ro+ghly 80% o% 
the Catholic vote.  Some Protestants and Jews voted %or Kennedy as a 
testimony to tolerance, an appeal s+tly +sed y the Democrats.  Nixon 
privately gr+mled ao+t this tactic +t to his credit never allied with 
religio+s igots eager to moilize on his ehal%.  Evangelicals and 
%+ndamentalists painted the most l+rid pict+re o% a Catholic in the White 
Ho+se.  Several prominent lieral Protestants with an exaggerated sense o% 
the Pope’s power over his worldwide %lock also looked on with s+spicion.
 Kennedy managed to win narrowly eca+se religion-related iss+es were 
not as central to national politics as they wo+ld ecome within a decade and 
a hal%.  There were aortions and gay Americans in 1960 +t presidential 
candidates were not expected to answer q+estions ao+t s+ch +ndergro+nd 
ehavior.  Th+s Kennedy co+ld ne+tralize what he laeled the “so-called 
religio+s iss+e” y rejecting diplomatic relations with the Vatican and 
rep+diating government %+nding o% parochial schools as +nconstit+tional. 
To e s+re, JFK had to make these points over and over and over again.  In 
the end, he de%ended an “asol+te” separation o% ch+rch and state that %rom 
the perspective o% presidential candidates in 2008 so+nds almost as dated as 
Je%%erson’s deism.  “The President is not elected to e protector o% the %aith—
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or g+ardian o% the p+lic morals.  His attendance at ch+rch on S+nday 
sho+ld e his +siness alone, not a show case %or the nation (Kennedy, 
pp.112-119).
 It was not only Kennedy’s election +t also and perhaps more 
importantly his assassination, %ollowed y intense national mo+rning and a 
televised Latin Mass, that legitimized Catholicism in the White Ho+se. 
Moreover, the divisions associated with the “sixties” q+ickly dwar%ed this 
religio+s iss+e.  A%ter JFK’s s+ccessor Lyndon Johnson led the United States 
into the disastro+s Indochina war, hardly anyone cared that the leading anti-
war candidates in 1968, Democratic Senators E+gene McCarthy and Roert 
Kennedy, were Catholics.
 Like the “%i%ties,” the “sixties” need to e reconcept+alized with d+e 
disregard %or the decimal system.  As a social and c+lt+ral “decade,” the 
sixties stretched %rom ro+ghly 1965-66 to 1973-74.  Once again we m+st dig 
eneath clichés and nostalgia.  The “sixties” was not a radical era +t a 
polarized era.
 Altho+gh %ar less dramatic than camp+s demonstrations, let alone 
+rning cities, signs o% polarization co+ld e %o+nd on the religio+s scene. 
While Protestant theological conservatives tended to s+pport the Vietnam 
War o+t  o %  ro+t ine patr io t i sm,  l iera l  Protes tants  and Jews 
disproportionately joined the doves o+t o% principle.  Both Rev.  Martin 
L+ther King, Jr., and Senator George McGovern, the 1972 Democratic 
presidential nominee, rooted opposition to the war in their own versions o% 
the social gospel.  E+gene McCarthy’s anti-war candidacy highlighted a 
change that seemed inconceivale in 1960, the development o% a Catholic 
le%t.  Similarly, there was a rightward shi%t among Jews who %elt threatened 
y a%%irmative action %or lacks and disliked eing s+pport %or Israel among 
lierals.  The loosening o% sex+al mores, res+rgence o% %eminism as a social 
movement, and start o% a national campaign %or gay rights %+rther divided 
religio+s lierals and conservatives.
 Americans str+ggled to make sense o% deep social changes amid j+dicial 
decisions that rendered the United States o%%icially less religio+s.  According 
to the S+preme Co+rt, comp+lsory prayer in p+lic schools violated the First 
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Amendment.  Altho+gh +nrelated to religion as a technical legal q+estion, 
the decision in Roe v Wade (1973) that legalized almost all aortions t+rned 
aortion into the most volatile religion-related iss+e since Prohiition.
 In this context, President Richard Nixon—not George W. B+sh, Ronald 
Reagan, or Jimmy Carter—ro+ght overtly politicized religion ack to the 
White Ho+se.  A%ter his election in 1968 Nixon aspired to +ild a “new 
Rep+lican majority” y appealing to “Sq+are America,” a constit+ency 
committed at minim+m to religion-in-general.  Nixon held religio+s services 
in the White Ho+se and advertised his %riendship with Billy Graham, with 
whom he privately exchanged anti-Semitic anter.  R+nning against 
McGovern in 1972 Nixon ecame the %irst Rep+lican to carry the Catholic 
vote.
 Not s+rprisingly a%ter the t+rmoil o% the “sixties” and the Watergate 
scandal that %orced Nixon to resign in 1974, 1976 prod+ced the most devo+t 
pair o% presidential candidates since McKinley and Bryan 80 years earlier. 
Both Rep+lican President Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter, the Democrat 
who narrowly de%eated him, considered themselves “orn again” Christians. 
Compared to Episcopalian Ford, So+thern Baptist Carter talked m+ch more 
openly ao+t his %aith—to the discom%ort o% some Catholic and Jewish 
voters.  B+t Carter +nderstood that the loc o% evangelical voters that had 
een growing since World War II wo+ld rally to one o% their own as a 
presidential candidate.  
 A competent lay theologian in%l+enced y the “Christian realism” o% 
Reinhold Nie+hr, Carter was essentially a theological lieral with a 
so+thern evangelical style; in recent years he has roken with the 
increasingly conservative So+thern Baptist Convention.  In 1976, this style 
attracted a signi%icant minority o% theologically conservative Protestants who 
otherwise wo+ld have voted %or Ford.  Cosmopolitan jo+rnalists st+nned y 
the news that at least a q+arter o% the pop+lation consisted o% orn again 
Protestants marveled that Carter ta+ght S+nday school and signed letters, 
“Yo+r rother in Christ.”  Str+ggling to catch +p with this aspect o% 
American reality, they over-reacted and exaggerated the in%l+ence o% Carter’s 
%aith on his presidency.
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 Carter’s religion a%%ected his policies in one important respect.  Drawing 
on Nie+hr, he tho+ght that nations—like individ+als—sho+ld g+ard 
against the sin o% pride.  As m+ch as was possile %or any American 
president, Carter criticized his own co+ntry as a pride%+l and arrogant 
nation.  He showed more gen+ine respect %or small and non-white nations 
than any o% his presidential predecessors.  Carter q+ickly identi%ied himsel% 
with the iss+e o% international h+man rights, which was already on the 
American agenda when he ran %or president.  Altho+gh Carter’s %oreign 
policy %ell %ar short o% the “asol+te” h+man rights policy he promised, his 
e%%orts on ehal% o% dissidents did save lives in several co+ntries.
 Carter’s %ragile political coalition was eroded primarily y economic 
“stag%lation” and %oreign policy crises, +t religio+s %actors also contri+ted 
to his de%eat in 1980.  Evangelicals and %+ndamentalists soon realized that he 
was religio+sly and politically more lieral than he had appeared in 1976. 
He was one o% a long line o% Baptists who elieved in the strict separation o% 
ch+rch and state.  Altho+gh personally opposed to aortion he rejected a 
Right-to-Li%e Amendment to the Constit+tion to overt+rn Roe v. Wade. 
Starting in 1978-79, Rep+lican political pro%essionals recr+ited in%l+ential 
“televangelists” to trans%orm amorpho+s %+ndamentalist and evangelical 
discontent into political action.  The most prominent o% the proli%erating 
“new Christian right” organizations was the Moral Majority led y Rev. 
Jerry Falwell.  Catholics and Protestants on the right cooperated more than 
ever +t Protestant theological conservatives provided the +lk o% the rank-
and-%ile.
 At the same time, many Jews tho+ght Carter too so%t on the Soviet 
Union and too hard on Israel.  Jewish political intellect+als took the lead in 
creating what came to e known as “neoconservatism,” a worldview that 
accepted m+ch o% the wel%are state rejected y traditionalist conservatives 
while also demanding an assertive %oreign policy.  R+nning against 
Rep+lican Ronald Reagan and independent John Anderson, a moderate 
evangelical, Carter in 1980 received a lower percentage o% Catholic and 
Jewish votes than any Democrat since the 1920s.
 In religion as in other respects, Reagan p+t together the most 
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remarkale coalition since that created y his erstwhile hero FDR; it 
stretched %rom the %+ndamentalist Falwell to the sel%-descried “saloon 
singer” Frank Sinatra (who, like Reagan, was a %ormer Democrat).  Altho+gh 
Reagan in 1980 said that he had experienced something like an evangelical 
spirit+al reirth, he was remarkaly eclectic in his %aith.  The eclecticism 
came nat+rally %rom his ackgro+nd; the child o% a Catholic %ather and 
Protestant mother, he was ro+ght +p as a tolerant and optimistic memer 
o% the Disciples o% Christ.  While in Hollywood, Reagan gained %ame (and a 
nickname, the “Gipper”) playing a Catholic %ootall star on screen.  Over the 
years he showed interest in B’hai, the Shro+d o% T+rin, and premillennialist 
Bile prophecy.  A%ter an assassination attempt in 1981, he concl+ded that 
God had spared him to end the Cold War.  In this religio+s eclecticism, 
shared y millions o% Americans in the 1980s, Reagan resemled a New Age 
version o% Eisenhower.
 The Christian right held a very j+nior partnership in Reagan’s coalition. 
Tax c+ts and assertive %oreign policy were his main concerns; administration 
priorities never incl+ded the Right-to-Li%e Amendment or restoration o% 
prayer to p+lic schools.  Nevertheless, evangelicals and %+ndamentalists 
ecame the most important mass constit+ency in the Rep+lican party. 
Alarmed lierals, incl+ding 1984 Democratic presidential nominee Walter 
Mondale, tried in vain to convince voters that Reagan was a tool o% the new 
Christian right.  Citing Reagan’s %lirtation with Bile prophecy, a %ew 
cosmopolitan theological determinists spec+lated that he might start a 
n+clear war in order to hasten Jes+s’s ret+rn.
 While Protestant right leaders like Falwell had to settle %or ro+tine 
endorsements o% school prayer and rie% visits to the White Ho+se, Reagan 
worked closely with Catholic cold warriors at home and aroad.  The most 
prominent o% these was Pope John Pa+l II, who ecame a de %acto Central 
Intelligence Agency partner in the e%%ort to +ndermine Comm+nism in 
Eastern E+rope.  In 1984, when Reagan estalished diplomatic relations with 
the Vatican, his allies on the Protestant right arely complained.  That same 
year, he ecame the second Rep+lican to win a majority o% the Catholic 
vote.
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 By 1988, not only did diverse presidential aspirants em+late Reagan’s 
standard closing line in speeches, “God less America,” +t p+tative 
religio+s conversions had also ecome so %ashionale that Vice President 
George H.W. B+sh said that he, too, was a orn again Christian.  Certainly 
he was a Christian, with a li%e long record o% attending Episcopal and 
Presyterian services and teaching S+nday school.  In addition, the Vice 
President actively co+rted the new Christian right.  Still, %ew evangelicals 
co+nted B+sh as one o% their own.  They had little political alternative, 
however, a%ter B+sh won the Rep+lican nomination.  Democratic candidate 
Michael D+kakis, a pro %orm adherent to the Greek Orthodox Ch+rch, was 
the most sec+lar major party nominee since Adlai Stevenson.  Among B+sh’s 
many appeals to patriotism and %aith d+ring the 1988 campaign, he noted 
the asence o% the word “G-O-D” in the Democratic plat%orm.
 B+sh lost to Democrat Bill Clinton in 1992 eca+se the economy had 
s+nk into a recession.  Religion-related iss+es a%%ected the ethos o% the 
election rather than the o+tcome.  President B+sh had paid even less 
attention to core Christian right iss+es than Reagan had.  Partly %or this 
reason, his renomination was challenged y Pat B+chanan, a Catholic 
conservative with s+pport among evangelicals and %+ndamentalists.  To 
paci%y this constit+ency, B+chanan and conservative Pentecostal televangelist 
Pat Roertson were allowed to deliver militant speeches at the Rep+lican 
National Convention.  B+chanan in partic+lar stressed a “c+lt+ral war” in 
the United States, with godly Americans on one side and relativists, 
sec+larists, and enemies o% the %amily on the other.  According to B+chanan, 
Bill and Hillary Clinton had stood with the c+lt+ral radicals since the 
“sixties.”  Proaly more than any other event, B+chanan’s speech sealed the 
hyperolic term “c+lt+re war” into the national political lexicon.
 The c+lt+ral sho+ting match with the Clintons has never ended.  From 
one perspective, the conservative attack makes sense.  Altho+gh sel%-
conscio+sly centrist in economics, Bill and Hillary Clinton were socially and 
c+lt+rally the most lieral President and First Lady in American history. 
President Clinton has had lack %riends all o% his ad+lt li%e.  Early in his 
administration he tried +ns+ccess%+lly to li%t the an on gays in the military. 
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Clinton did reverse exec+tive orders y Reagan and B+sh that restricted 
international aid to programs o%%ering advice ao+t aortion.  His personal 
li%e made matters worse.  In 1998-99 the Rep+licans in Congress tried to 
remove Clinton %rom o%%ice eca+se he had lied +nder oath ao+t a sex+al 
relationship with a woman yo+ng eno+gh to e his da+ghter.  
 Altho+gh predictale +nder these circ+mstances, the Christian 
conservative sho+ting at the Clintons looks odd in one respect: oth are 
personally at least as religio+s as their respective predecessors, George H.W. 
B+sh and Barara B+sh.  Hillary Clinton has een a Methodist social 
gospeler since adolescence—a social gospeler who elieves in the power o% 
prayer to a%%ect h+man a%%airs.  D+ring the mid 1990s, along with millions o% 
other Americans, she %lirted with New Age s+pplements to her Christianity. 
Formally a Baptist, Bill Clinton comined womanizing with spirit+al 
searching in a %ashion reminiscent o% Lyndon Johnson; certainly no other 
%+t+re president has een c+rio+s eno+gh to attend a Haitian voodoo 
service.  While in o%%ice he contin+ed the practice o% ending speeches y 
asking God to less the United States.  He also signed the International 
Religio+s Freedom Act o% 1998, which was intended to export the c+rrent 
American version o% religio+s %reedom to the rest o% the world.  In the end, 
m+ch as theological conservatives and social gospelers have con%ronted each 
other since the 1920s, the Protestant right dislikes the Clintons so intensely 
eca+se they practice what seems to e the wrong kind o% Christianity.  
 In 2000, the Democrats nominated Vice President Al Gore, an 
ostentatio+sly non-womanizing spirit+al searcher who had eg+n li%e as a 
Baptist.  At that point, Gore’s spirit+al search had led him to join in the %ad o% 
wearing a “WWJD” pin, an all+sion to Charles Sheldon’s q+estion “What 
wo+ld Jes+s do?” From the perspective o% the history o% American religion 
and politics, the most notale aspect o% Gore’s candidacy was his selection o% 
Senator Joseph Lieerman, a “modern Orthodox” Jew, as his r+nning mate. 
There was virt+ally no anti-Semitic acklash.  
 Rep+lican George W. B+sh, who de%eated Gore in a close and 
controversial election, was the most convincingly orn again nominee since 
Jimmy Carter.  Un%ort+nately, the news media’s +nderstanding o% 
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evangelicalism has not improved m+ch since 1976.  Overall mainstream 
jo+rnalists exaggerate or misinterpret the in%l+ence o% B+sh’s religion on his 
p+lic policies.  At least some evangelicals know etter +t pre%er to 
celerate the President as one o% their own instead o% closely examining his 
elie%s and actions.  In 2008, there%ore, B+sh’s administration is %orm+laically 
caricat+red as a “%aith-ased” presidency.
 B+sh is a orn again Christian.  Growing +p, he attended Episcopal and 
Presyterian services.  He remained a practicing Protestant even as a yo+ng 
ad+lt, when he drank heavily, +sed illegal dr+gs, and %lo+ndered in search 
o% a career.  The spirit+al reirth came at ro+ghly age 40 in the mid 1980s.  At 
minim+m, this emrace o% evangelical Protestantism helped him to stop 
drinking and to start making his way in +siness and politics.  Asked in 1999 
to name his %avorite philosopher, B+sh cited Jes+s Christ—eca+se, he said, 
Christ saved his li%e, meaning his earthly li%e.  Carter’s conversion was land 
y comparison.  Indeed, no other American president has +ndergone s+ch a 
asic ehavior change in midli%e.
 O% co+rse neither B+sh’s ehavior nor his personality changed 
completely.  He reg+larly reads the Bile and commentaries on Script+re yet, 
+nlike Carter, shows no interest in the intellect+al side o% Christianity.  The 
sense that he had %o+nd Jes+s rein%orced one long standing trait, a strong 
con%idence in his own aility to make the right decisions.  B+sh also retains 
his pre-conversion sense o% h+mor.  To the distress o% his most pio+s 
s+pporters, he occasionally lapses into oscenities and estows v+lgar 
nicknames on associates.  Nor is he a strict parent.
 In addition to misconstr+ing B+sh’s personal %aith, p+ndits emphasize 
%o+r other %acets o% his ostensily “%aith ased” administration: his 
appointment o% evangelicals; his endorsement o% conservative Christian 
positions on aortion, irth control, and stem cell research; his advocacy o% 
“%aith ased initiatives” in social wel%are policy; and his p+lic religio+s 
practices and rhetoric.  All o% these %actors need to e examined more 
care%+lly.
 Leading Protestant conservative appointees have incl+ded B+sh’s %irst 
attorney general, Pentecostal John Ashcro%t, and his est speech writer, 
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evangelical Mark Gerson.  At the top ranks, however, most positions have 
een %illed y ro+tinely religio+s (y American standards) Protestants, 
Catholics, and Jews.  There has een no “orn again” test %or appointment. 
Since the resignations o% Ashcro%t and Gerson, no evangelical has elonged 
to B+sh’s inner circle.  The President’s c+rrent chie% o% sta%%, Josh+a Bolten, 
openly lives with his girl %riend.  In the long r+n B+sh’s most conseq+ential 
appointments %or religion-related iss+es are S+preme Co+rt Chie% J+stice 
John Roerts and Associate J+stice Sam+el Alito, oth conservative 
Catholics.  
 B+sh has given more mid level posts to conservative Protestants than 
Reagan did, especially in program areas related to sex+ality.  These o%%icials 
regard %amily planning as a q+estion o% sex+al astinence rather than irth 
control.  S+ch appointments reveal less ao+t B+sh’s theological a%%inities 
than ao+t the increased in%l+ence o% evangelicals and %+ndamentalists in 
the Rep+lican party since the 1980s.  Altho+gh B+sh proaly dislikes 
aortion at least as m+ch as Reagan did, he has done even less to advance a 
Right-to-Li%e Amendment.  Indeed, nothing B+sh has said matches Jimmy 
Carter’s statement in 2005 that he co+ld not imagine Jes+s sanctioning an 
aortion.  
 The %aith-ased initiative was the religion-related iss+e closest to B+sh’s 
heart d+ring his %irst term.  This proposed legislation wo+ld allow religio+s 
social service agencies to compete %or %ederal %+nding on the same asis as 
sec+lar gro+ps.  The constit+tional q+estion was as n+anced as the co+rt 
decisions were m+rky.  Religio+s social service agencies already received 
millions o% dollars %rom the %ederal government, partic+larly %or 
h+manitarian work aroad.  Federal co+rts had regarded this practice as 
constit+tional %or more than a cent+ry—as long as the religio+s gro+ps did 
not engage in “pervasively sectarian” ehavior.  This term was imprecise, as 
were the S+preme Co+rt decisions in the 1990s that +rged “ne+trality” in 
choosing etween religio+s and sec+lar gro+ps seeking government 
contracts.  As constr+ed y the B+sh administration, these recent r+lings 
allowed %aith-ased charities to emphasize their religio+s side while still 
competing %or %+nds on the asis o% their social service competence.  The 
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legislation B+sh proposed in 2001 wo+ld have made this right explicit.  At 
the same time his exec+tive orders estalished new o%%ices in the White 
Ho+se and several departments to help the process along.  
 Altho+gh Clinton and Gore also endorsed %aith ased initiatives in 
principle, congressional Democrats complained that B+sh’s speci%ic proposal 
was rooted in Rep+lican partisanship as well as religio+s %aith.  Their 
s+spicions were well %o+nded.  Partly eca+se his own conversion helped to 
save B+sh %rom alcoholism, he does elieve that a religio+s component 
enhances e%%orts to resc+e addicts, rehailitate criminals, and +pli%t the poor. 
Nonetheless, expanded appropriations %or religion-related social services 
co+ld have ro+ght a %inancial wind%all to Christian right gro+ps so 
important to the Rep+lican coalition.  The %aith-ased initiative stalled in 
Congress and then, a%ter the United States was attacked on Septemer 11, 
2001, received minimal attention %rom the White Ho+se.  The chie% res+lts 
have een a small increase in %+nding %or conservative religio+s social 
services and a change in the tax code to enco+rage charitale donations.  
 An extraordinary Rep+lican moilization o% evangelicals and 
%+ndamentalists helped B+sh to de%eat Democrat John Kerry in 2004.  M+ch 
more interesting was the twenty-%irst cent+ry version o% the Catholic iss+e. 
Tho+gh a %airly devo+t Catholic, Kerry de%ended the constit+tional right to 
aortion; he was openly criticized y a hand%+l o% Catholic ishops %or doing 
so.  On election day, B+sh narrowly carried the Catholic vote.  Therea%ter 
religion-related iss+es sank to a new low on the President’s list o% priorities. 
Indeed, one disill+sioned evangelical, a %ormer White Ho+se adviser on 
religio+s matters, p+lished a ook charging the administration with 
cynically co+rting devo+t Christians %or political gain.  Notwithstanding 
B+sh’s sincere personal %aith, it was always naïve to think otherwise.
 Meanwhile, political and religio+s lierals contin+e to oject that B+sh 
prays %or divine g+idance e%ore making major %oreign policy decisions and 
j+sti%ies American actions aroad in moralistic, sometimes explicitly 
religio+s lang+age.  What needs to e emphasized is that s+ch ehavior is 
hardly +nprecedented among American presidents.  British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair may have joined B+sh in prayer (to the consternation o% many 
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Blair s+pporters in the United Kingdom) +t this event, i% it occ+rred, was 
less remarkale than Eisenhower’s attempt to take Nikita Khr+shchev to 
ch+rch.  B+sh prayed %or divine g+idance e%ore going to war in Iraq; Carter 
prayed %or divine g+idance e%ore making one last e%%ort, +ltimately 
s+ccess%+l, to negotiate the Camp David Accords in 1978.  B+sh calls 
%reedom a gi%t %rom God; so did Franklin Roosevelt, Eisenhower, and the 
second sentence o% the Declaration o% Independence.  Speech writer Michael 
Gerson has emphasized his det to the righteo+s rhetoric o% FDR and JFK.
 No historian’s appeal %or an acc+rate +nderstanding o% the past has ever 
stopped a c+lt+ral sho+ting match.  I do not expect to s+cceed either. 
Depending on where we look and how we concept+alize the q+estion, the 
United States has grown oth more religio+s and less religio+s since 1960. 
The lo+dest sho+ters on oth sides o% this divide dislike the stat+s q+o. 
While many Americans want the United States to ecome more religio+s, 
hope%+lly thro+gh a Sixth Pretty Good Awakening, others want to make the 
co+ntry more sec+lar.  Both celerants and critics o% the B+sh administration 
may legitimately pre%er a president who speaks o%ten or never ao+t his 
personal %aith as long they do not claim that their respective positions are 
warranted y the whole o% American history.  The sec+larists wo+ld e on 
%irmer intellect+al gro+nd i%, a%ter acknowledging a long i% intermittent 
tradition o% strong presidential religiosity, they candidly arg+ed that the 
co+ntry now m+st move on.  However the rival arg+ments develop, the 
latest c+lt+ral sho+ting match will +ndo+tedly persist %or the %oreseeale 
%+t+re.
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Summary
 This article traces the impact o% religion on American national politics 
%rom independence in 1776 to the present.  The story egins with the c+rrent 
controversy ao+t the religio+s elie%s o% the most %amo+s “Fo+nding 
Fathers” and the creation o% a sec+lar rep+lic via the Constit+tion and its 
First Amendment.  The nineteenth cent+ry was marked y growing 
religio+s diversity, notaly %ragmentation within the Protestant majority and 
the arrival o% signi%icant Roman Catholic and Jewish minorities, as well as 
the growing impact o% religio+s iss+es on politics.  In general devo+t 
Protestants s+pported the Federalist, Whig, and Rep+lican parties, while 
Catholics and %ree thinkers +s+ally %avored the Democrats, a tendency that 
has contin+ed to the present.  Protestant advocates o% the “social gospel” 
were especially active d+ring the pre-World War I re%orm movement that 
historians warily call Progressivism.  World War I deepened religio+s 
divisions, and the 1920s was marked y many itter religion-related 
controversies, incl+ding increased anti-Semitism and Protestant opposition 
to the %irst Catholic nominated %or president y a major party (Democrat Al 
Smith in 1928).   D+ring the Great Depression President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt created a remarkale Democratic coalition that incl+ded most 
Catholics and Jews along with many so+thern conservative Protestants.  The 
period etween World War II and the early 1960s ro+ght a m+lti%aceted +t 
increasingly tolerant religio+s revival that has a%%ected national politics to 
the present.  The most recent six presidents (Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, 
Ronald Reagan, George H. W. B+sh, Bill Clinton, and George W. B+sh) have 
een more conventionally Christian than the %irst six (George Washington, 
John Adams, Thomas Je%%erson, James Madison, James Monroe, and John 
Q+incy Adams).  Nonetheless, religion-related con%lict has persisted and, 
compared to the 1950s, even escalated.  President Ronald Reagan ro+ght a 
“new Christian right” into his Rep+lican coalition, and President George W. 
B+sh, a orn again Protestant, co+rted this conservative constit+ency with 
some high level appointments and the rhetoric o% American mission. 
Democrats and sec+larists harshly criticized B+sh’s tactics.  We m+st eware 
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o% joining commentators who descrie these con%licts, in typical American 
hyperole, as a “c+lt+re war.”  Rather, they represent the latest in a long 
series o% c+lt+ral “sho+ting matches” seeking to de%ine a normative 
“American Way o% Li%e.”
